My book project, Animal Values: A Pragmatist Ethic for Our Relationship with Animals, begins with an obvious yet surprisingly poorly understood claim: we have fallen into habits of consumption that are harming animals. In this book, I draw on the resources from classical pragmatist philosophy to derive an account of the nature of habit and theorize the important role that the feeling of moral discomfort and the emotions that provoke it play in changing our habits of thought and behavior. Although emotions can skew our epistemic landscapes – by prompting us to look for reasons to justify false beliefs and actions that harm animals – they can also serve as occasions of inquiry, and, hence, as vehicles for how we can change our consumption habits for the better. This is especially true of emotions such as guilt and shame, emotions that we have been taught are bad for us, but which I believe are important for disrupting our habits of conduct and initiating inquiry into our relationship with other animals. I also argue that to make animal suffering salient in the public domain, we need some means of disrupting our habitual ways of thinking and feeling. To this end, I discuss the role that art can play not only in sensitizing us to justice, but also in revealing to us that many of the values that matter to us — emotional wellbeing, safety and freedom — also matter to animals. Art, I conclude, can be an effective means by which to initiate collective inquiry into how we can improve the lives of animals.